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UNITED STATES v. VILLAMONTE-MARQUEZ:*
BURIAL AT SEA FOR THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT?
Drug smuggling into the United States has generated controversy over fourth amendment standards governing searches
at sea.' The fourth amendment to the Constitution guarantees
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 In
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,3 the Supreme Court interpreted a statute that provides for vessel 4 registration inspections 5 at sea. 6 In doing so, the Court sanctioned investigatory
* 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
1. There are basically three divisions of waters of the seas: internal
waters, territorial waters, and the high seas. The internal waters are located inland from the coast. The territorial waters extend three nautical
miles from the coastline. The United States claims territorial sovereignty
within this three mile area. The high seas are those waters beyond the territorial waters. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1923). See
also Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV.
51, 56-58 (1977). 'The term 'customs waters' means, . . . the waters within
four leagues of the coast of the United States." 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1976).
One maritime league is equal to three nautical miles. C. COLOMBOS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 88 (6th ed. 1967).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularily describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
4. 'The word 'vessel' includes every description of water craft or other
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in
water, but does not include aircraft." 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982).
5. All American vessels of at least five tons used for commercial purposes must submit to periodic inspections by the Coast Guard and keep a
certificate of inspection on the vessel at all times. 46 U.S.C. §§ 399, 400
(1976). Smaller American vessels are required to have a state-issued identification number displayed on the boat at all times subject to inspection. 46
U.S.C. § 1470 (1982). Foreign vessels are required to carry a manifest that
must be available for inspection. 19 U.S.C. § 1439 (1982).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982) [hereinafter referred to as section 1581(a) I
provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or
vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters
or, as he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act, [19 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq.], or at
any other authorized place, without as well as within his district, and
examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any
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stops and searches conducted by customs officers of foreign 7
and domestic vessels without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity and without explicit qualification regarding the location of
the vessel.8 The Court held that this practice was not contrary to
the fourth amendment standards that govern searches and
seizures. 9
On March 6, 1980, customs officers 10 stopped and boarded
the Henry-MorganH. 11 The ship was anchored eighteen nautical miles inland on the Calcasieu River.' 2 The officers informed
person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and

stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel
compliance.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Section 1581(a) applies to foreign vessels. See supra note 5. The
protections of the fourth amendment are also applicable to foreign vessels
and aliens. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See also United States v.
Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978) (fourth amendment protection
applies to any vessel or alien subject to prosecution of American laws). Accord United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) (fourth
amendment applies to American law enforcement activities abroad). But
see United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (Roney, J.,
concurring) (indicating foreign vessels on the high seas do not have constitutional protection).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 2573.
9. Id. at 2582.
10. The United States customs officers were accompanied by several
Louisiana state police officers. 103 S. Ct. at 2577. Louisiana state law authorizes state police officers to make similar registration inspections to those
authorized in section 1581(a). Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:851.14
(West 1964) with 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). The Louisiana statute does not,
however, authorize searches but provides that "[a] state police officer has
the authority to stop and board any vessel for the purpose of ... requiring
appropriate proof of indentification therefrom, examining the certificate of
numbers issued ... or in the absence of such certificate require appropriate proof of identification of the owner or operator of the vessel. . . ." LA.

§ 34:851.14 (West 1964). The defendants argued that because the state police officers searched their ship, and were not authorized
to do so, this act constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Brief for
Respondents at 10, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573
(1983).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 2576. Head Customs Officer Wilkins decided to board
the Henry-Morgan II for two reasons. First, he did not recognize the boat's
home port, Basilea, as being a home port in the United States. It was subsequently discovered that the home port of Basilea is located in Switzerland.
Id. The vessel's registration documents indicated that the ship was registered in France. Id. Second, after an unsuccessful attempt to communicate
with the crew, Officer Wilkins concluded that the vessel was foreign because a crew member appeared unable to understand English. United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1981).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 2576. The Calcasieu River Ship Channel is a waterway
connecting the gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana. Lake Charles
is a designated Customs Port of Entry for the Houston, Texas Region. All
vessels traveling between Lake Charles and the Gulf of Mexico must pass
through the channel. Id. The Calcasieu River Ship Channel is also known
as the Lake Charles Ship Channel. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
652 F.2d 481, 483 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
REV. STAT. ANN.
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the crew that they were conducting a registration inspection and
requested the ship's registration papers. 13 After boarding to
conduct the purported 14 registration inspection, the officers
commenced a more thorough search of the ship 1and
found ap5
proximately 5,800 pounds of marijuana on board.
The crew was arrested and charged with conspiring to import marijuana, 16 importing marijuana, 17 and conspiring to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute. 18 They were
subsequently convicted in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana.' 9 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that
the stopping and searching of the Henry-Morgan II was "unreasonable" in the absence of reasonable suspicion of illegal
20
activity.
13. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
14. On March 5, 1980, Customs Patrol Officer Harrison received information from a reliable informant that there were two loads of mar'juana on
two separate ships in the area. The informant could not describe the vessels or their location. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 482
(5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 2573 (1983).
15. 103 S.Ct. at 2577. While examining the Henry-Morgan II's registration papers, Officer Wilkins stated that he smelled burning marijuana. After a further inspection of the vessel, Wilkins observed defendant
Villamonte-Marquez sitting on several bales of marijuana. Id. An officer's
visual or olfactory observations are usually the best evidence to suggest
probable cause in drug cases. Wales, Probable Cause to Arrest or Search in
Drug Cases, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. no. 5 (1974). See United States v.
Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973) (probable cause established when
customs officers smelled burning marijuana); Fumagalli v. United States,
429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970) (sighting brick shaped kilos of marijuana). Cf.
Han-is v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (upholding admission of evidence in "plain view" where officer acts lawfully). In Harris,the Court upheld the seizure of an automobile when its registration card fell within the
"plain view" of a police officer as he opened the door of an impounded vehicle. Id. But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Coolidge Court warned that in "plain view" cases, the police officer must have
had prior justification for the intrusion in the course of which he comes inadvertently across evidence incriminating the accused. Id. at 456. For a discussion of the applicability of the "plain view" doctrine, see Comment,
Development in the Law of WarrantlessAuto Searches, 16 WIl.AMEr E L.J.
677 (1980).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982)).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 952(a)
(1982)).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1)(1976) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1982)).
19. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, No. 80-20012-01/02 (W.D. La.
Dec. 21, 1981).
20. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir.
1981). For other Fifth Circuit decisions concerning vessel searches, see
United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980) (incorporated the
reasonable suspicion standard in section 1581(a) to uphold a search made
at night in coastal waters), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981); United States v.
Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1979) (upheld a search of a vessel traveling
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 21 This decision resolved a
conflict which had existed among the circuits concerning the issue of fourth amendment guarantees for searches conducted at
sea. 22 The Court addressed the question of whether the practice
of stopping and boarding vessels by customs officers, acting pursuant to statutory authority and without reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity, 23 violated the fourth amendment. 24 The Court
held that 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) [section 1581(a) ], which authorized
at night without navigational lights), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980); United
States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1979) (upheld a search of a vessel
traveling without documentation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1980); United
States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979) (speeding through a "no
wake" zone generated a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
21. 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
22. Compare United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809 (lth Cir.), (requiring a reasonable suspicion before stopping and boarding a vessel), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 165 (1982); and Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.
1981) (reasonable suspicion standard); and United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1979) (reasonable suspicion standard); with United States v.
Hilton, 619 F.2d 127 (1st Cir.) (authorizing customs officers to stop and
board a vessel without a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); and United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th
Cir. 1980) (suspicionless boardings); and with United States v. Glaziou, 402
F.2d 8 (2d Cir.) (requiring customs officers to have a mere suspicion of illegal activity before stopping a vessel), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
23. The concept of "reasonable suspicion" is based upon the totality of
the circumstances. Police officers must have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting that the person stopped is engaged in illegal activity.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1978). See United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.) (defendant's avoidance of police coupled with fact
that he fit description of robber), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981). The
Supreme Court has offered guidelines as to what factors should be considered to determine reasonable suspicion: the proximity to the border; the
usual pattern of traffic; independent information from informants; the
driver's behavior; the number and behavior of the occupants in the vehicle;
and the aspects of the vehicle itself. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 885 (1975).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2575. The Court also addressed the question of whether
the case was moot because the defendants had been deported subsequent
to the issuance of the mandate by the Court of Appeals vacating their convictions and indictments. The Court concluded that because the grand jury
returned valid indictments, deportation did not render the case moot. Id. at
2575-76. The Court noted that there is the possibility that the defendants,
who are now free could be extradited and imprisoned for their crimes, or if
they re-enter the country, they would be subject to arrest and imprisonment for their convictions. Id. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the
government could not seek appellate review because it had voluntarily terminated the litigation. Id. at 2583. According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government may "by leave of court file a dismissal of an
indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon
terminate." FED. R. CRinM. P. 48(a). Brennan contended that the Government's failure to secure an immediate review of the interlocutory order
barred its motion to reinstate the defendant's convictions. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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customs officers to stop and board any vessel at anytime and at
any place in the United States in order to examine its registration papers, was constitutional. 25 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the customs officers' acts of stopping and boarding
the Henry-Morgan II were consistent with the fourth
26
amendment.
The Court began its analysis by examining the historical
background of section 1581(a). Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, 27 noted that the lineal ancestor to this statute, the
Act of August 4, 1790,28 had been enacted by the same Congress
that had promulgated the fourth amendment. 29 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because the predecessor of section 1581(a)
and the fourth amendment were both enacted by the First Congress, the First Congress did not consider suspicionless vessel
boardings and searches contrary to the fourth amendment. In
30
support of its conclusion, the Court noted that prior case law
25. 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
26. Id. at 2582.
27. Id. at 2575 (Burger, C.J., White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, J.J.,
joined in the majority opinion; Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Marshall, J., joined, and in Part I of which Stevens, J., joined).
28. The majority relied on section 31 of the Act to reach its holding. Id.
For a complete text of section 31, see infra note 52. Section 31 and section
48 of the Act of 1790 were re-enacted without substantial change in 1799.
Section 31 was re-enacted as ch. 22, § 54, 1 Stat. 668 (1799) and section 48
became ch. 22, § 67, 1 Stat. 677 (1799). For a complete text of section 48, see
infra note 55. In 1866, Congress revised the Act and incorporated both sections into one statute. This statute authorized customs officers to board any
vessel "if it shall appear" that a violation of the laws of the United States
had been committed. Ch. 201, § 2, 14 Stat. 178 (1866). Carmichael, At Sea
with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MLAmi L. REV. 51, 67-69 (1977). In 1922,
Congress revised the statute, deleting the reasonable suspicion standard, in
order to enforce duty collection on the high seas. Maul v. United States, 274
U.S. 501, 528-29 (1927). See also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 560 (1927)
(citing history of Tariff Act of 1922).
29. 103 S. Ct. at 2582. The Villamonte-Marquez Court's reliance on the
"impressive historical pedigree" of section 1581(a) is possibly ill-founded
because the First Congress also passed other bills and statutes which were
subsequently found unconstitutional. See TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 25 (1969). For an excellant discussion of how the

historical background of the fourth amendment offers little help in addressing modern problems, see Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures
as Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89, 140-43 (1982). Accord
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the Court rejected a similar historically-based argument previously relied on in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), finding that the individual's right to be free
from searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions should not
be based upon historical impulses behind the fourth amendment. Accordingly, the individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures must be judged in a modern context. Id. at 365-66.
30. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977) (upheld a search
of several airmailed envelopes where a customs officer had reason to suspect they contained drugs); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1866)
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had determined that a similar customs search statute 3 ' was in
32
harmony with the prohibitions of the fourth amendment.
Hence, the Court analogized that the enactments of 1790 are
33
similarly consonant with the amendment.
In finding that this search procedure was within the construction of the fourth amendment, the Court rejected the contention that land search standards should govern marine
searches. 34 The Court emphasized that the distinction between
a vessel located in waters which offer ready access to open sea
and an automobile on a principal highway within the boarder
area 35 is more than sufficient to require different fourth amend(holding an act of Congress unconstitutional based on earlier congressional
acts).
31. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 43, 1 Stat. 29 (provided for the regulation
of the collection of duties by customs officers who had "reason to suspect" a
violation).
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2578-79. See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
150 (1925) (citing the Act of July 31, 1789, with its reasonable suspicion standard, to support the Court's holding).

33. 103 S.Ct. at 2578.
34. Id. at 2579. The defendants argued that the fourth amendment land
standards should apply to vessels located near the border. Brief for the Respondents at 15, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct. 2573 (1983).
For a discussion of the border area and its functional equivalent at sea, see
infra note 35. Stops and searches of automobiles conducted at the border
need not be based upon a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See also United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (searches of vehicles along the border are
reasonable by virtue of the fact that vehicles are able to cross the border).
For a more detailed explanation of the need to conduct suspicionless
searches in the border area, see infra note 63. Suspicionless stops and
searches may also be conducted at the functional equivalent of the border if
it can be proved with reasonable certainty that the vehicle had crossed the
border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Almeida-Sanchez Court defined the functional equivalent of the border as
wherever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search
may be. Id. at 273. Stops and searches made by officers on roving patrol
away from the border must be based on a reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
35. The term "border" refers to the actual borderline as well as its functional equivalent. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(refused to extend the border 20 miles from the actual borderline). For a
definition of the functional equivalent of the border, see supra note 34. See
also Hermann, Recent Developments in the Law of Border Searches, 9
SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP.73 (1982) (Part I of a two part article discussing
Supreme Court's policy concerning border searches). See generally Note,
Almeida-Sanchez and its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone Search
Law, 17 ARIZ. L. REV.214 (1975) (defining functional equivalency concept).
In a maritime context, the border extends 4 leagues (12 nautical miles)
from the coastline. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1976). See also Note, High on the
Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches
at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REv.725, 735 (1980) (discussion of border searches on
the seas) [hereinafter cited as Note, High on the Seas.].

19841

United States v. Villamonte-Marquez

ment standards. 36 The Court stated that customs officers cannot
maintain permanent border checkpoints 37 in order to observe
every vessel entering United States waters. 38 Vessels can move
in any direction, at any time, and do not have to follow any established "avenue" of travel. Thus, the attempted analogy to
land searches conducted in the border area was inappropriate
39
according to the Court.
In addition to distinctions in the nature of travel, the Court
found that the difference in the motive for registration of vessels
and that of automobiles justify suspicionless boardings. 40 This
conclusion was reached by weighing the government's interest
against the individual's fourth amendment interests. 41 The principal motive behind vessel registration laws is to protect the
public by regulating participation in trade, enforcing environmental laws, collecting duties, and regulating imports and exports.42 The government, therefore, has a legitimate interest in
boarding a vessel to inspect its registration documents. 43 The
Court decided, on the other hand, that the individual's interest
is merely in the right to make "free passage without interruption." 44 After weighing these interests, the Court concluded that
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2580. For a detailed discussion concerning the application of different fourth amendment standards based on the factual differences between vessels and automobiles, see infra notes 67-75 and
accompanying text.
37. A checkpoint is a fixed station along the border or its functional
equivalent where customs officials can search the vehicle and its occupants.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976). For a discussion
concerning the border and its functional equivalent, see supra note 35.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
39. Id. at 2579-80.
40. Id. at 2580. The Court noted that there is not a comparable uniform
licensing system for vessels. Id.
41. A balancing of interests is an accepted method of fourth amendment
analysis. Note, The Fourth Amendment Afloat: Customs Searches, Drug
Smuggling, and the Balancing Test in the Fifth Circuit, 68 GEO. L.J. 1035,
1045 (1980). See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (balancing test
used to hold random automobile stop unreasonable); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (balancing test used to hold suspicionless
border search reasonable); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878-84 (1975) (balancing test used to hold stop of automobile away from the
border unreasonable unless there is a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (balancing test used to hold a stop and
frisk of a suspect reasonable); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967) (balancing test used to hold warrantless administrative search
unreasonable).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2581.
43. See Note, High on the Seas, supra note 35, at 738-50. See generally
Annot., 40 A.L.R. FED. 402 (1978) (discussing government's authority to inspect vessels outside territorial waters).
44. 103 St. Ct. at 2581 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 557-58 (1976)). Individuals who are lawfully in the United States have
the right to make "free passage without interruption" or search unless a law
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the government's interest in assuring compliance with registration requirements was greater than any resultant intrusion on
45
an individual's fourth amendment interest.
The Court's reasoning in Villamonte-Marquez is not persuasive. In the area of search and seizure, the Court's primary objective has been to eliminate the exercise of standardless and
unconstrained discretion on the part of law enforcement officers. 46 Nevertheless, for the first time in the history of the
fourth amendment, the Court has permitted "completely random seizure and detention of persons" 47 on private property,
with no corresponding limitation placed on the government offi48
cial's discretion.
The Court's holding fails for three reasons. First, the statutory history of section 1581(a) belies the Court's interpretation
of section 1581(a). Secondly, the difference in the nature of
travel between a vessel and an automobile does not justify a
deviation from the fourth amendment search and seizure standards usually afforded to the individual. Finally, the government's interest in promoting safety on American waterways by
way of registration inspections does not outweigh the individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Villamonte-Marquez Court reasoned that, because the
First Congress had enacted the Act of August 4, 1790, the predecessor to section 1581(a), the statute is not inconsistent with the
fourth amendment and must, therefore, be constitutional.4 9 The
history of section 1581(a), however, refutes the Court's reliance
on the intent of the First Congress. The statute cannot be presumed to be constitutional in the manner the Court has
determined.
Aware of the colonists' hatred toward England's suspicionless vessel search statute, 50 the 1790 Congress enacted a
enforcement officer has reason to suspect the individual is engaged in illegal activity. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2581-82.
46. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967) (complete discretion of police officers

undermines the purpose of the fourth amendment).
47. 103 S.Ct. at 2585 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Random" or "arbitrary"

stops conducted by officials in the field are stops made in the absence of
articulable facts which lead to a reasonable suspicion. These stops are not
made pursuant to a systematic pattern of activity designed to reduce the
possibility of singling out an individual for special treatment. Saltzburg,
The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firmaof the United States,
20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 750 n.49 (1980).
48. 103 S.Ct. at 2585.
49. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
50. In 1862, the British Parliament enacted a customs statute similar to
section 1581(a). This statute authorized the examination of ships, vessels
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less intrusive search statute which still ensured the collection of
duties on cargo entering the United States.5 ' Section 31 of the
53
1790 Act, 52 upon which the Villamonte-Marquez Court relied,
authorized customs officers to board a vessel in order to conduct
a registration inspection; the statute, however, did not require
54
any reasonable suspicion of a violation prior to the boarding.
55
authorized customs officers to
Section 48 of the same Act
and persons on board to find articles sought to be imported or exported
without appropriate duties having been paid. Its purpose was to control
colonial smuggling. As late as 1761, the colonists were being subjected to
this arbitrary power and vigorously denounced its application. When the
colonists gained their independence, they took the opportunity to provide
against unreasonable searches and seizures in their declaration of rights.
Stengel, The Backgroundof the Fourth Amendment to the Constitutionof the
United States, 3 U. RICH. L. REv. 278, 293-95 (1969). See also N. LASSON, HIsTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 67-72 (1937) (portraying England's use of general writs of assistance in customs searches of
vessels as a factor contributing to the American Revolution).
51. See Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 51, 66-70 (1977). Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, realizing the extent of the discretionary power conferred upon customs
officers under the Act of August 4, 1790, wrote:
[Customs officers] cannot be insensible that there are some prepossessions against it, that the charge with which they are entrusted is a delicate one, and that it is easy by mismanagement to produce serious and
extensive clamour, disgust and alarm. They will keep in mind that their
countrymen are free men, and, as such, are impatient of every thing
that bears the least mark of domineering spirit. They will, therefore,
refrain, with the most guarded circumspection, from whatever has the
appearance of haughtiness, rudeness, or insult.
Id. at 70, quoting UNITED STATES COAST GUARD BOARDING MANUAL 1-1 (CG253, 1972).
52. Section 31 provided:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors, and the officers of the revenue cutters ... to go on board ships or
vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the
coast thereof, if boundfor the United States, whether in or out of their
respective districts, for the purpose of demanding the manifest aforesaid, and examining and searching the said ships or vessels; and the
said officers respectively shall have free access to the cabin, and every
other part of the ship or vessel.
Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164. (emphasis added). (Current
version at 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976)). For the text of section 1581(a), see
supra note 6.
53. 103 S.Ct. at 2578 n.4.
54. See supra note 52.
55. Section 48 provided:
That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specifically appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall havefull power
and authority to enter any ship or vessel in which they shall have reason
to suspect any goods, wares or merchandisesubject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize and secure any such goods,
wares, or merchandise.
Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 48, 1 Stat. 170 (emphasis added) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976)). For the text of section 1581(a), see supra
note 6.
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board and search any vessel in which customs officers had "reason to suspect" that goods subject to duties were being
56
concealed.
The application of section 31 or of section 48 depended upon
the jurisdictional location of the vessel. Section 31 restricted
suspicionless searches to vessels which were both 57 within 12
nautical miles of the coast and had the intent to be "bound for
the United States. '5 8 Section 48, in contrast, authorized
59
searches without regard to location or entry into the country.
According to the maxims of statutory construction, 60 sections 31
and 48 must be construed so as to be in harmony. Consequently, section 48, with its express requirement of reasonable
suspicion, applied to vessels located away from the border area,
whereas section 31, which had no corresponding requirement,
56. Id.

57. Section 31's phrase "within four leagues of the coast thereof, if

bound for the United States", was deleted from section 1581(a). See supra

note 6. One commentator suggests that this is because smugglers would

always claim that they were not bound for the United States if they were
searched outside of the United States' territorial waters but within four
leagues of the coast. Carmichael, At Sea with the FourthAmendment, 32 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 51, 68 (1977).
The Villamonte-Marquez Court noted that the phrase "if bound for the
United States" qualifies only the phrase "within four leagues of the coast".
103 S. Ct. at 2578 n.4. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the phrase "if
bound for the United States" qualified the phrases "within four leagues of
the coast" and "in any part of the United States". This reasoning resulted
in the interpretation that section 31 authorized customs officers to board
and search vessels in the internal border area waters. The phrase "in any
part of the United States" was intended to mean that customs officers could
wait to search the ship when it reached port, subsequent to being spotted in
the border area. Since the Henry-Morgan II was not spotted until it was
passed the border area, the Villamonte-Marquez Court incorrectly relied on
section 31. Id. at 2586 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
border area and its functional equivalent at sea, see supra note 35.

58. See supra note 52. See also Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187 (2 Cranch)
(1804) (limited section 31's application to vessels within 12 miles of the
coast); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1098 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980)

(Rubin, J., concurring) (discussing the application of section 31 and section
48).
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925) (discussing the applicability of section 48);
United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1098 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J.,
concurring).
60. Where a statute contains both general and specific provisions, the
sections must be read to harmonize all provisions of the act. E. CRAWFORD,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATuTEs

265-66 (1940). See also F.

MCCAFFEREY,

U.S. 535, 551
(1974) (courts should not pick and choose among provisions).
Accordingly, section 31 was intended to be a border search statute,
while section 48, which has no location requirement, was intended to apply
to vessels located away from the border. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at
2580 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 37 (1953); Morton v. Mancari, 417
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61
applied only to vessels located in the border area.
62
The Henry-MorganII was not searched in the border area.
Because section 31 was intended to apply only to vessels located
in the border area,63 the Court was incorrect to rely on that section as a means of determining the intent of the First Congress
for interpreting section 1581 (a). The Court should have, instead,
looked to section 48 of the Act, with its expressed reasonable
suspicion standard, in order to determine the true intent of the
First Congress concerning searches conducted away from the
border.
Historically, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act of
August 4, 1790, and its progeny to require customs officers to
have, at a minimum, a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity
before conducting a search beyond the border area.64 This standard was first established in Carrollv. United States.6 5 The Car-

61. Id. (arguing that the phrase "in any part of the United States"
meant that once customs officers spotted a vessel in the border area, they
could follow the ship to its port and then search it). See supra note 57. See
also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925) (addressing the applicability of the reasonable suspicion standard found in progeny of section
48). In Carroll, the Supreme Court interpretated a lineal descendant of the
Act of August 4, 1790, the Act of March 3, 1815, to require customs officers to
have at least a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before conducting a
search within the United States but beyond the border area. Id. See also
United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1098 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J.,
concurring). See generally Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAmi L. REV. 51, 59-68 (1977) (discussing the history of customs
searches).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 2585 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Henry-Morgan 11
was stopped and searched eighteen miles inland from the coast and six
miles away from the border area. Id. at 2577. For a discussion of the border
and its functional equivalent at sea, see supra notes 34 and 35.
63. See supra notes 57 and 61 and accompanying text. Suspicionless
border searches are distinguishable from searches pursuant to criminal investigations requiring probable cause for a number of reasons. First, because the individual crossing the border belongs to a class whose members
frequently violate certain laws in the process of entering, the fact of his
crossing is by itself some evidence that he may be violating some law. Second, because the individual crossing the border is on notice that certain
types of searches are likely to be made, his expectation of privacy is lessened. Third, because personal searches at the border are administered to a
class not deemed unworthy, such searches lack the quality of insult felt by
an individual signaled out for search. Note, Border Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968).
64. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (requiring probable cause to
uphold a vessel search 12 miles beyond the borderline); Maul v. United
States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927) (requiring probable cause to uphold a vessel
search 34 miles from the borderline); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (requiring probable cause to uphold an automobile search 16 miles
from the border).
65. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Supreme Court decided this case during the
Prohibition era. Id. This reflects the view the that Court considered an individual's fourth amendment rights superior to the needs of law enforcement even in times of national unrest. Stetter, Coast Guard Boardingsof

The John Marshall Law Review

[ Vol. 17:545

roll Court, cognizant of the broad language of the statute,
recognized the need to require safeguards against arbitrary
66
abuse by law enforcement officers.
The Villamonte-Marquez Court, however, discarded these
safeguards, contending that the factual differences between vessels located in waters offering ready access to the open sea and
automobiles on principal highways in the border area are sufficlent to require different search standards. 67 The Court's main
reason for discarding land-based precedents 68 is that no reasonable discretion-limiting feature, such as permanent checkpoints,
would be practical in a maritime setting. 69 The boarding of the
Henry-Morgan II, however, took place in a river channel, which
must be transversed by all vessels moving between Lake
Charles 70 and the open sea.7 1 The Channel bears a strong
resemblence to a highway in which a Border Patrol could set up
72
permanent check points.
In addition to the above-stated similarity, the practice of
randomly stopping vessels in order to check their registration
documents is analogous to the random investigatory stops of individuals in automobiles. 73 Both procedures require the vehicle
operators to alter their course of travel and be subjected to a
search. Additionally, private boats have been viewed as analogous to private homes, 74 thus being accorded greater fourth
75
amendment protection.
Suspected Drug Smuggling Vessels on the High Seas and the FourthAmendment: United States v. Streifel, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 607, 621-22 (1982).
66. 267 U.S. at 150-51.
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
68. See supra note 34.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
70. See supra note 12.
71. Id.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 2589 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random auto stop);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrol);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); see generally 3 W. LAFAVE,

§ 9.2(f), (g) (1978).
74. Several cases have held that the reasonable expectation of privacy
may be stronger on a vessel. A vessel is far more likely to serve as the
temporary residence of the owner or crew than an automobile. See United
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1979) (boat equivalent to a
home). But see United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.), (cars and
boats accorded the same treatment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979).

75. The sanctity of a private dwelling is ordinarily afforded the most
stringent fourth amendment protections. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (some individualized suspicion necessary to constitute permissible search and seizure); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1981) (physical entry into a home is the chief evil against which the fourth
amendment is directed); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (search of
home presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a search warrant).
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The fourth amendment is meant to protect people, not
places. 7 6 Permitting searches which are not tested by appropriate factual grounds for suspicion, or by any objective standard
which governs the exercise of discretion, "invites intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches. '77 The proscriptive purpose of the fourth amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by law enforcement
officials. 78 The Villamonte-Marquez Court, however, ignored
this principle by sanctioning a discretionary search because it
was conducted in connection with an administrative inspection.79 The Villamonte-Marquez holding conflicts with the
Court's previous warnings against standardless or uncon80
strained discretion.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions on administrative
searches 81 require that some standards be imposed as a means
of safeguarding against unrestrained discretion by law enforcement officers in their selection of places to be searched. 82 In Delaware v. Prouse,83 for example, the Court was called upon to
determine the constitutionality of a discretionary search based
solely upon the power to conduct routine administrative inspections. The Prouse Court held that stopping and searching a vehicle in order to conduct an administrative search is
"unreasonable" unless the officer has reason to suspect a viola76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz court found that
"what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to

the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
77. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).

78. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
79. 103 S.Ct. at 2582.
80. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).

The

Supreme Court has relaxed the fourth amendment standards for closely
regulated industries. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (approval of a warrantless inspection of a locked storeroom of a fire arms
dealer during business hours); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless inspection of a federally licensed liquor
dealer permitted by statute). But see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307

(1978)

(refusal to extend the relaxed standards to other government

industries).

81. An administrative search is a routine inspection of a class of persons
or businesses in order to secure compliance with various regulations or
statutes. Rothstien, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 2
SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. no. 9 (1975).
82. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (requiring officers to

have reasonable suspicion of noncompliance with automobile regulations
before stopping and searching); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (requiring warrant to search apartment for housing code violations);
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (requiring warrant to search commercial warehouse for fire code violations).
83. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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tion of the law. 8 4 The Prouse Court also held that the requirement of reasonable suspicion provides the government with an
interest without
adequate means of guarding the individual's
85
subjecting him to arbitrary intrusions.
The potential for abuse of discretion in conducting adminis8 6
trative searches may be especially acute in a maritime setting.
Customs officers perform dual roles as safety regulators and as
general criminal law enforcers. The availability of authority to
conduct an alleged safety inspection may invite an abuse of that
power. 87 In fact, customs officers have openly admitted that
they regularly use administrative search powers as a guise to
conduct searches for contraband. 88 The Supreme Court has traditionally held that "pretext searches" 89 are unconstitutional
abuses of the fourth amendment. 90 Nevertheless, the Villamonte-Marquez Court permitted customs officers to board and
search the Henry-Morgan II for contraband under the guise of
84. Id. at 663.
85. Id. at 654.
86. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1313 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). See also Note, supra note 41, at 1049 (administrative search doctrine should not be applied to pleasure boats). Cf.United
States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1263 n.23 (5th Cir. 1978) (no reason to perform safety and documentation checks on foreign vessels).
87. Note, High on the Seas, supra note 35, at 743.
88. One example of the manner in which law enforcement agents have
abused their power to conduct suspicionless searches for contraband is
"Operation Stopgap." Under "Operation Stopgap," the Customs Department combined efforts with the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
and the armed forces to stop the importation of drugs. A coast guard officer,
involved with the operation, described a typical boarding of a vessels as
follows:
If we suspect a ship of carrying narcotics, and it doesn't stop we fire a
warning shot with the biggest gun available to make the biggest splash.
Then we board, usually with five men in a smaller boat, well armed. We
say we are operating under the law ... It's a subterfuge. We say we
are running a check for compliance with U.S. law. Or we say: 'We are
authorized under umpty-umpty-ump of the government something, and
we board.'
Note, High on the Seas, supra note 35, at 738 n.70, quoting Boston Globe,
Sept. 17, 1978, at 7 (Parade Magazine) (statement of Commander John
Steeper, U.S.C.G., Head of General Law Enforcement Section) (emphasis
added).
89. Pretext searches are those in which the searching officer pretends to
be searching for one, legally sufficient, reason; but is, in fact, found to be
searching for another, legally insufficient, reason. Burkoff, Pretext
Searches, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1982).
90. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (administrative search
should be limited to the scope necessary to fulfill the regulatory purpose);
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (restricted administrative search
warrant to purpose for which issued). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, §§ 9.4(f), 10.8(b) (1978) (criticizing pretext searches).
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an administrative search. 9 1
The permissibility of this practice must be judged by balancing the individual's fourth amendment interests against the
promotion of a legitimate government interest.92 The individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is protected by the
fourth amendment. 93 The fourth amendment was designed to
protect the individual from arbitrary intrusions, even at the cost
of diminishing the effectiveness of law enforcement. 94 The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not
disappear because the individual is on a vessel subject to gov95
ernment regulations.
The Villamonte-Marquez Court, on the contrary, held that
the government's interest in assuring compliance with registration requirements outweighed the individual's fourth amendment interest. 96 The Court justified this conclusion by stating
that the intrusion "involved only a brief detention where officials come aboard, visit public areas of the vessel, and inspect
documents. ' 97 The actual language of section 1581(a), however,
is much broader.
Section 1581 (a) permits customs officers to "search the vessel" and "every part thereof', "and [to] use all force necessary
to compel compliance."'9 8 Despite the Court's limited interpretation, the statute still addresses itself to an unrestrictive search.
The individual's constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is an indispensible right; 99 it should not
be ignored merely to assure compliance with vessel registration
requirements, particularly when the statute involved would permit an unlimited search once it had been commenced.
If the Court's concern really is for maintaining compliance
with vessel registration requirements, less intrusive alternatives
91. 103 S.Ct. at 2582.
92. See supra note 41.
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). For a complete text of
the fourth amendment, see surpa note 2.
94. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-75 (1973)
(needs of law enforcement must give way to constitutional safeguards);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arbitrary searches violative of constitutional rights).
95. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979) (constitutional
protections do not disappear because automobile subject to state regulation); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (routine
checkpoints subject to post-stop judicial review). But cf. Cady v. Donbrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (warrantless search of an automobile may be
justified by public safety concerns).
96. 103 S.Ct. at 2582.
97. Id. at 2581.
98. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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are available. An effective means of protecting both the individual's interests and the government's interests would be to prohibit random searches at sea and, instead, permit vessel
searches under a mandatory dockside inspection program.10 0
Alternatively, customs officers could conduct inspections at sea
alongside the vessel without boarding it. 10 1 In addition, courts
could exclude all evidence obtained during pretext registration
02
inspections.
Obviously, the most effective method to assure compliance
with vessel registration requirements would be to require that
every vessel entering American waters be searched. Because
there simply are not enough resources to implement such a policy, 10 3 however, the most practical solution would be to require
customs officers to have at least a reasonable suspicion of noncompliance with registration requirements before stopping the
10 4
vessel at sea. This standard, recognized internationally,
1 5
To
should be the "touchstone for judging searches at sea."'
require customs officers to have a reasonable suspicion before
boarding a vessel would serve to protect the individual's inter06
ests with little cost to law enforcement.
100. See Comment, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas?,
34 MERCER L. REV. 1537, 1562 (1983) (dockside inspection program favorable
alternative to pretext searches). Cf. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2589
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (fixed checkpoints in territorial waters would satisfy the Government's needs); Klutz v. Beam, 374 F. Supp. 1129 (W.D. N.C.
1973) (suggesting periodic inspection program as opposed to broad state inspection statute).
101. 103 S.Ct. at 2590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Note, High on the Seas, supra note 35, at 745. Cf.Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MiNN.L. REV. 349, 437-38 (1974) (applying exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a stop and frisk
arrest). But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (exclusionary rule does
not apply to legitimate police activity).
103. There are several practical difficulties in policing the seas: the extensive physical area covered by the ocean; the lack of exact territorial
boundaries; and the impracticability of stopping every vessel at a set
boundary. In addition, the intrusion upon the individual's privacy interest
is minimal. United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1978). See
also United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1980)
(enumerating other practical difficulties of policing the seas).
104. Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas requires a reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity before stopping and boarding a vessel. Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, art. XXII, Para. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200. See also Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of
Intoxicating Liquors, May 22, 1924, United States-Great Britain, 43 Stat. 1761
art. II, para. 2 (requiring a reasonable suspicion before seizing a vessel).
105. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1089 (5th Cir. 1980).
106. It would not be burdensome to require the law enforcement officers
to have a reasonable suspicion before boarding a vessel because vessels
carrying contraband tend to demonstrate articuable grounds for identifying
violators. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975). See, e.g.,
United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980) (erratic movements
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In conclusion, the Villamonte-Marquez Court's rejection of
the reasonable suspicion standard is not supported by the legislative history of section 1581(a) and the controlling case law.
For the first time in the history of the fourth amendment, the
Court has permitted random searches without providing safeguards against abuse. The Villamonte-Marquez Court was less
than straightforward in its analysis; in actuality, it was seeking
to curb drug smuggling, even at the expense of violating the
fourth amendment. The Court's failure to define the scope and
limitations of suspicionless searches made pursuant to section
1581(a) weakens the individual's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. This constitutionally protected right
has traditionally been superior to the interests of law enforcement. The choice between protecting the individual's fourth
amendment rights and satisfying the needs of law enforcement
is clear. Unfortunately, the Villamonte-Marquez Court chose to
bury the individual's fourth amendment rights at sea.
William J. Arendt

of shrimping vessel out of shrimping season), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967
(1981); United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1979), (traveling at
night without navigation lights); United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303
(5th Cir. 1979) (speeding through a "no wake" zone), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
965 (1980).

